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Understanding and preventing corruption: Lessons from the UK 
expenses scandal 
 
JAMES L. NEWELL 
 
 
Introduction 
 
2009 is likely to be remembered by most British parliamentarians as one of the most 
traumatic in their careers as politicians; for that was the year of the great MPs’ expenses 
scandal, which saw hundreds of MPs publicly accused of having abused, for personal 
gain, the system for reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of their 
duties – leading to large numbers of resignations and dismissals; an unprecedented degree 
of public anger, and pressure for political reform going well beyond the issue of expenses 
itself. One of the most high-profile of the MPs involved, the former cabinet minister, 
Hazel Blears, explained her resignation from the Government by saying,  
 
I’d had four weeks of intense media pressure, the like of which I have never known, 
not just on me but on my husband, my dad, my family. At that point I’d had enough 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8097955.stm) 
 
Meanwhile another MP wrote on her political blog that the scandal had created such an 
unbearable atmosphere at Westminster that everyone there feared a suicide, and that 
many of her colleagues were ‘beginning to crack’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics 
/8063005.stm).  
 
Of course there is nothing new about scandals arising from allegations of financial 
impropriety on the part of those in public life. What I think makes this particular scandal 
significant is first of all its scale: Britain had never really had an affair of this kind of 
quite these dimensions in recent decades but now seemed to take its place alongside other 
European democracies in having had a scandal that seriously damaged confidence in the 
probity of an entire political class: one thinks here of the great ‘Bribe City’ scandal in 
Italy in the early 1990s, for example. But second – and this is the issue I want to focus on 
here – it is significant for what its characteristics have to say to us with regard to current 
concerns about organised crime. This might seem like a very odd thing to say given the 
sheer gulf that separates the world of the average parliamentarian from that of criminals 
involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, product piracy and so forth. But I want to 
argue that the characteristics of the saga have four important things to say about these 
matters, the first of which concerns the nature of organised crime as a concept.  
 
The organised-crime concept 
 
In this regard, the first important point to note about the expenses scandal is that little or 
nothing of what has come to light can actually be said to be illegal. Rather, what outraged 
the public about the revelations was really two things, first, the fact that Parliament had 
attempted to prevent disclosure despite the passage, in 2000, of the Freedom of 
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Information Act which gives the public a general right of access to information held by 
public authorities. There are certain absolute and qualified exemptions under the Act with 
the right to appeal to an Information Commissioner where an applicant for information 
believes his or her request has been wrongly rejected. And in fact the scandal originated 
in October 2004 when the journalist, Heather Brooke, began to ask for details of MPs’ 
expenses and when refusals led to a series of appeals which in their turn led to the 
attempt – through a House of Commons motion debated in January 2009 and then 
withdrawn under public pressure – to exempt MPs’ expenses from the scope of the 
Freedom of Information Act. In the meantime, a series of media exposés culminated in 
May with the publication by the Daily Telegraph of a leaked copy of all the expenses 
claims, which it revealed in instalments from 8 May over several weeks.  
 
What scandalised the public in the second place is that MPs appeared to have 
taken advantage of a loose specification and application of the rules on expenses to profit 
financially. For example, the so-called Green Book parliamentary expenses rules allowed 
MPs to claim the costs of running a second home in recognition of the fact that they in 
effect have to live in two places: in their constituencies and somewhere in or near London 
to enable them to attend Parliament. This so-called ‘additional cost’ allowance enabled 
MPs to claim up to £24,006 per annum for things like the mortgage interest payments and 
the utility bills associated with a second home – but officials also allowed claims for 
furniture and refurbishments, electrical items and food, and it came to light that MPs 
were able repeatedly to switch the designation of their second homes, enabling them to 
claim for renovating and furnishing more than one property. MPs could use renovations 
significantly to add to the value of a property and then sell it, or claim for a second home 
while in fact renting it out. They could also designate a property as their second home to 
the parliamentary fees office while designating it as their primary residence with the tax 
authorities in order thereby to avoid paying tax on any capital gain when they sold it. 
When submitting expense claims, MPs had to sign a declaration confirming that the 
expenses had been incurred exclusively and necessarily for the purposes of performing 
their duties as a Member of Parliament, but they did not have to provide receipts for 
anything under £250 and it seems that fees office staff were unwilling to challenge 
members who had declared that their expenses were legitimate. Consequently, a number 
of the revelations, when they were made, provided the material for stinging media satire, 
the claims of Tories Douglas Hogg (for clearing the moat at his manor) and Peter Viggers 
(for an ornamental duck house) being just two of the most memorable examples.  
 
But, to repeat, very little if any of this activity can be said to have been illegal and 
indeed MPs sought to defend themselves by saying that they did not even break any rules, 
lax though these rules may have been. While a handful of claims are being investigated to 
determine whether they provide the basis for a prima facie case of fraud or false 
accounting, no criminal charges have as yet been brought. Much less have any allegations 
of actual bribery been made. So there are significant obstacles in the way of using the 
term ‘corruption’ in connection with anything that has happened.  
 
However, what is also clear is that the reserve is equally true. To deny that the 
term is applicable to the case also faces large obstacles. Impressionistically, the term 
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‘corruption’ seems to have been widely used by the public in commenting on the affair 
and this is not surprising: with whatever justification, MPs’ behaviour was perceived by 
the public as falling short of their more or less precisely understood notions of integrity 
and accountability: this is why they were angry. And whatever else it means, the term 
‘corruption’ refers to an infringement of rules – where a ‘rule’ is a criterion of behaviour 
that indicates right and wrong ways of doing things; is something that can only exist in 
virtue of social interaction, and is something whose infringement is to some greater or 
lesser degree morally condemned in the group whose social existence gives rise to it. 
Therefore, to describe given acts as ‘corrupt’ is to condemn them as illegitimate 
according to the standards of one’s own group or at least the group with which one 
identifies – which in turn means that we cannot know what counts as corruption unless 
we know something about the moral codes of the group to which the person seeking to 
apply this label belongs.1
 
 In short, ‘corruption’ is a social construct, not something that 
exists independent of people’s perceptions of it. 
I would suggest that terms like ‘terrorism’ and ‘organised crime’ belong to the 
same category. Terms in this category cannot refer to extra-discursive objects of 
knowledge. Thus, it is impossible to define these terms in such a way that we can expect 
universal agreement that given actions are covered by them. If ‘terrorism’ ‘involves the 
commission of outrageous acts designed to precipitate political change’ (Cronin, 2003: 
33), then we are obliged to acknowledge that for many, the US and British invasion of 
Iraq was an outrageous act designed to precipitate political change. If ‘organised crime’ 
refers to ‘Criminal activity carried out by an organized enterprise’ (West’s Encyclopaedia 
of American Law, 1998), then one wants to know, how organised the enterprise has to be: 
‘There is some degree of organization even in a group of two middle-class girls who, on 
the way home from school, drift into Woolworths and shoplift some lipsticks’ (Cressey, 
1972: 12).  
 
What is clear on the other hand is that terms like these are routinely deployed by 
political and social actors themselves in order to advance their goals and manage power 
relationships; for, given the extraordinary evaluative load these terms carry, their usage in 
everyday discussions has real political and social consequences. For example, if the 
agents of law enforcement are able to convince us that ‘organised crime is on the march’, 
then they are likely to succeed in increasing their budgets and raising their own status. 
Tony Blair and George W. Bush would never accept the label ‘terrorist’ for themselves 
because to do so would be to demolish at a stroke any claim to occupy moral ground 
higher than that occupied by Bin Laden. Where dissent is risky, allegations of corruption 
can be one way of taking a regime to task without directly challenging its claims to rule 
(Johnston, 2005: 5). What is interesting when it comes to academic analysis therefore, is 
less to explore the causes of ‘organised crime’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘corruption’ defined in 
                                                 
1 The centrality of moral codes to what counts as corruption remains even in the case of those definitions of 
the term that appear to render it independent of such codes: for example,  principal-agent definitions – of 
the most widely used definitions seemingly the most independent of public attitudes – are independent only 
in appearance, for they make the difference between corrupt and non-corrupt actions turn on the principal’s 
– socially informed – decisions about the interests and preferences the agent is to be required to advance. 
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some more-or-less arbitrary way, than to explore the extent to which these concepts are 
used discursively (by politicians, other academics, the mass media and so on) – how, 
why, and with what consequences. So if the first thing that the expenses saga has to say 
of relevance to the issue of organised crime is that we should be mindful of the socially 
constructed nature of concepts like this one, then the second thing that it has to say to us 
is that in order to understand better the nature of reality we should explore the actual 
usage of these terms by real actors in political and social life. 
 
Its deployment as a term 
 
Under this rubric, a first and most obvious point is that since the beginning of the 1990s 
the terms have had a much higher profile in public discussion than they did before. We 
used the LexisNexis Professional on-line database – which contains full-text articles from 
UK national and local newspapers – to explore the occurrence, in Guardian headlines, of 
three sets of words or phrases over the 25 years from 1984 to 2008: ‘corrupt’ and ‘bribe’ 
and their derivations (‘corruption’, ‘corrupting’, ‘corrupted’, ‘bribery’, ‘bribed’ etc.); 
‘terrorism’, ‘terror’ and ‘terrorist’, and finally, ‘organised crime’. Figures 1 to 3 present 
the results. In all three cases there are clear upward trends so that – for example – the 
average for ‘terror’ and its derivations is 181 per year during the first five years and 439 
in the last five, while the corresponding figures for ‘organised crime’ are 172 and 551. A 
similar situation is true for the terms related to corruption. 
 
If we ask about the causes underlying these increases, then while some things can 
be said with a degree of certainty, other suggestions are necessarily more speculative. In 
the first place, one cannot help being struck by the massive boosts given to the terms by 
one-off events of a highly dramatic nature. In the case of the terrorism terminology, the 
impact of the Twin Towers attack comes through so clearly in the data as hardly to 
require mentioning. In the case of the corruption-related terms, the impact of the general 
election of 1997 stands out. This was an election in which the Conservatives sought to 
defend themselves against allegations of ‘sleaze’ – an umbrella term covering acts of 
sexual impropriety, misuse of office, and material greed – from a position of weakness 
which the then Prime Minister (PM) had created for them by calling for a reassertion of 
family values and private morality in a ‘back-to-basics’ campaign launched in October 
1993. The subsequent revelation of conduct on the part of prominent Conservatives that 
was clearly at variance with what the PM was claiming was the party’s core values could 
not, in an election year, have been other than thrust centre stage by journalists for many 
of whom the unveiling of official hypocrisy is seen as a way of pursuing their calling as 
guardians of the public interest (Thompson, 2000; Moncrieff, 2005). 
 
Turning from journalists to party political actors, we encounter a possible 
explanation for the growing deployment of terms such as corruption and so on that is 
based on the changing structures of incentives and opportunities to which these actors are 
subject. In terms of incentives, a salient feature of party competition in recent years, not 
only in Britain, has been the decline in major ideological differences between the main 
party actors: in many respects the old divisions based on the pursuit of socialism or free 
enterprise have given way to much harder-to-detect differences between the parties with 
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the result that they have been obliged to mark out their distinctiveness in other ways. One 
of the ways in which they seem to have done this is by having greater recourse to what 
political scientists refer to as ‘valence’ issues as opposed to ‘position’ issues. Valence 
issues are ones that allow parties to compete on the basis of being more competent than 
their rivals, because they are issues revolving around states of affairs that everyone 
wants. And it is noticeable that corruption, terrorism and organised crime are all valence 
issues in that sense: everyone wants less corruption, less terrorism and less crime; no one 
wants more of them. In this respect, valence issues are fundamentally different from 
position issues, like public ownership of enterprise, taxation, welfare services and so on, 
typical of ideological conflict, and in relation to which people do take alternative stands. 
Here parties offer to achieve not the same outcome but different outcomes. A second 
effect of parties’ search for alternative bases of competition concerns the growing 
presence in political discourse of corruption-related terminology in particular; for the 
declining relevance of ideology and position issues seems also to have been accompanied 
by a growing tendency of parties to compete by throwing mud and attempting to damage 
each other by fomenting scandal, as the Lewinsky affair in America showed so forcefully 
– a phenomenon that Ginsberg and Shefter (2002) have called ‘politics by other means’. 
 
The heightened incentives on parties to compete in these ways are intimately 
connected to the greater opportunities to do so. Parties’ claims to be more competent than 
their rivals concentrates their listeners’ attention on the personal qualities of their 
candidates, something that has arguably been underpinned by what students of party 
politics have referred to as the shift of recent years from ‘party-‘ to ‘candidate-centred’ 
campaigning. The suggestion is that the development of opinion polling has given 
political actors unmediated access to information about voters, while television and other 
electronic media, have allowed candidates to appeal directly to voters – both 
developments having diminished the requirement for good party organisation and thus 
the attention to party itself in campaigns. Meanwhile, media developments have rendered 
the lives of the individuals who walk on the public stage ‘much more visible than they 
ever were in the past’ (Thompson, 2000: 6). If this has enabled politicians to compete by 
presenting themselves not just as leaders, but as human beings and therefore as ‘one of 
us’, then by encouraging their audiences increasingly to assess them in terms of their 
character as individuals (Thompson, 2000: 39-41) it has rendered them more vulnerable 
to the above-mentioned drives in the direction of politics by other means. 
 
In the third place, it seems no accident that all of this has coincided with the end 
of the Cold War, once the ultimate underpinning of the left-right ideological conflict that 
now seems so hard to discern in party competition. The end of the Cold War may have 
been influential in another way. The power of a regime is reinforced when those subject 
to its authority are fearful of external enemies. It may be simplistic to suggest that 
growing concerns about corruption, terrorism and organised crime are linked to a search 
for external enemies and that this is linked to the demise of communism, the former 
enemy; but a reasonably convincing tale can be told here.  
 
In their celebrated book, The Social Construction of Reality, Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckman (1967) point out that humans apprehend the social world around them 
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by recourse to ‘typifications’ (that is, the recognition that the action of another conforms 
to a pattern), in terms of which that world and that action is ‘dealt with’. The recurrent 
patterns of interaction that are established by means of these typifications constitute the 
social structure and its corresponding institutions. Institutions control human action by 
setting up predefined patterns of conduct that antedate the birth and outlive the death of 
the single individual. This is rather fortunate; for the biological fragility of humans makes 
institutions essential to their survival: By narrowing choices, institutions enable activity 
to be carried on with the greatest economy of effort. By rendering action predictable, 
they entail that ‘[e]ach action of one is no longer a source of astonishment and potential 
danger to the other’ (Berger and Luckman, 1967: 75). But they are also inherently fragile; 
for they only exist in virtue of humans’ on-going interaction, and this means that they are 
vulnerable to altered typifications and thus to altered patterns of interaction:  
 
Because…all social phenomena are constructions produced historically through 
human activity, no society is totally taken for granted…Every symbolic universe 
is incipiently problematic…The intrinsic problem becomes accentuated if deviant 
versions of the symbolic universe come to be shared by groups of ‘inhabitants’ [or 
if] a society is confronted with another society having a greatly different history 
(Berger and Luckman, 1967: 124-5). 
 
On the one hand, then, the alternative universes inhabited by communists, 
terrorists, corruptors and organised criminals pose a threat because their very existence 
 
demonstrates empirically that one’s own universe is less than inevitable. As 
anyone can see now, it is possible to live in this world without the institution of 
cousinhood after all. And it is possible to deny or even mock the gods of 
cousinhood without at once causing the downfall of the heavens. This shocking 
fact must be accounted for theoretically, if nothing more (Berger and Luckman, 
1967: 126). 
 
On the other hand, accentuating, or exaggerating the threat these universes pose, provides 
one with some of ‘the best possible reasons for the superiority of one’s own’ (Berger and 
Luckman, 1967: 126): for its institutions, by definition, embody shared knowledge about 
‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ forms of behaviour. Thereby, one’s universe provides ‘the 
[taken-for-granted] framework within which anything not yet known will come to be 
known in the future’ (Berger and Luckman, 1967: 75). 
 
The reality of organised crime    
 
For these reasons – and this is the third thought that is induced by reflecting on the 
expenses scandal – one feels inclined to treat with a degree of scepticism many of the 
claims made about organised crime and like phenomena by journalists, law-enforcement 
officers and others with a vested interest them painting them in lurid colours. An 
appropriately sceptical approach suggests that some of these colours are surely out of 
place. I have never had an opportunity to question an organised criminal or bribe-taker 
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but suspect that if I did I would come away feeling that their activities are every bit as 
prosaic as those of most inhabitants of the so-called upper world.  
 
For one thing, media images, which see organised crime as the activity of 
powerful, mysterious organisations having a complex internal division of labour, seem 
hard to credit. The illegality of the transactions in which organised criminals are by 
definition involved, makes it impossible for them to have recourse to the state for the 
enforcement of contracts, while the knowledge that this is so creates a strong incentive 
for market actors to swindle and cheat each other. In turn, the absence of trust 
presumably places enormous obstacles in the way of large-scale organisation. All else 
equal, it means that enterprises cannot retain large numbers of employees, or integrate 
upstream or downstream, as all these things increase the number of points of potential 
information leak, thus increasing the chances of arrest and confiscation of assets. It 
means that enterprises cannot get access to capital for expansion as they can offer no 
credible guarantees to creditors concerning the security of their capital.  I would therefore 
expect to find most co-called organised crime groups to be small, ephemeral and lacking 
in sophistication – as indeed most of the empirical evidence, so far as I am aware, 
confirms.2
 
  
In the second place, I am struck by the lack of a sense of culpability so often 
uniting those accused of wrong-doing, and by the degree to which the attitudes expressed 
are often easy to understand in the sense that we can imagine ourselves having the same 
views were we in the position of those involved. This thought is directly prompted by the 
expenses scandal one of whose most distinctive features has been the protestation of 
many MPs that media handling of their cases has been out of all proportion to the gravity 
of their alleged offences. The MP, Nadine Dorries, quoted in my opening section spoke 
for many of her colleagues when, during the course of a BBC interview, she said that 
‘MPs are all human beings and they do not deserve to be treated like this’ (BBC News 
Channel, 22 May 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics /8063005.stm). These 
attitudes are not surprising: the disclosures in fact took place over an extended period of 
time drawing ever wider circles of politicians into their net as the focus of investigations 
daily shifted to different individuals. In this respect – as in a large number of others 
(Newell, 2009) – the saga closely reflects the ‘Bribe City’ affair, which likewise 
provoked significant resentment on the part of the politicians involved that they were 
being unfairly targeted for conforming with a system – of illegal party funding in that 
case – that was widely known about and accepted. In that case too there was the strong 
sense that an entire political class was on trial – with media handling of the revelations, 
and politicians’ fear and uncertainty about whether they would be the next to be exposed, 
and for what, bringing massive pressure to bear on them. To take a third example, T. Dan 
                                                 
2 Indeed the findings of one author lead to the conclusion that paradoxically, the trade in illegal 
commodities, such as drugs, is difficult to eliminate, not because law enforcement agencies are faced with 
powerful large-scale criminal organisations, but because they are actually faced with the opposite situation. 
That is, since the drugs market is supplied by large numbers of small-scale traffickers, each with his or her 
own supplier, even the seizure of large amounts of drugs rarely has an impact on availability. For example, 
‘in 1994 over five tons of cocaine were seized on the outskirts of Milan. As a key expert put it, ‘the news of 
the day was not the seizure, but the fact that the Milanese market did not run out of cocaine even for half a 
day’’ (Paoli, 2003: 37). 
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Smith, charismatic leader of Newcastle City Council, imprisoned in the 1970s for his 
involvement in the Poulson affair involving bribes for the provision of re-development 
contracts, noted:       
  
the implication of so many...authors...was that I was a crooked 
councillor...Nothing could be further from the truth...I think (Poulson) behaved in 
a way...common to most businesses, of offering holidays, entertainment. If that is 
corrupt,...the boxes at Ascot and Wimbledon are full of the recipients of the same 
kind of inducements (quoted by Garrard, 2005: 16). 
 
The line between legitimate gift-giving and illegal corruption is indeed difficult to draw 
precisely. Reflecting on his interview-based research among those involved in EU fraud 
rings, David Nelken (2003: 228-9) refers to ‘the banality of organised crime’ noting that 
‘those who are actively engaged in EU fraud do their best to argue that everyone (or 
almost everyone) is corrupt – or at least corruptible. In seeking to ‘condemn the 
condemners’…they adopt an all embracing concept of corruption even describing the EU 
itself as a gigantic fraud’. Reading Nelken’s observations one feels prompted to say that 
when, in 1999, the entire Commission was forced to resign precisely because of massive 
fraud, his informants might have felt that they had suddenly been given some empirical 
support for their view about the EU. 
 
Such attitudes, if difficult to defend, are easy to explain in terms of the notion of 
reciprocity. Especially when it is widespread, illegal activity appears to affect the content 
of social norms, here understood as answers to questions of fairness, morality and justice, 
which indicate socially acceptable behaviour. To take the ‘Bribe City’ example, one of 
the things that investigations into this case revealed was that the systemic nature of the 
bribery involved eliminated actors’ sense that they were doing anything illegal. Enzo 
Papi recalled: 
 
When I was appointed Cogefar managing director I was given a booklet where all 
the ‘obligations’ and payment dates of the company were recorded: a list of 
names and numbers; an obligation that was to be rigorously honoured. Illegal 
dealings were so common that I did not feel I was perpetrating a criminal act 
(quoted by Varese, 2000: 7). 
 
It appears to be the case that most if not all cultures have norms of reciprocity. Therefore, 
where behaviour that is formally illegal is widespread, and not therefore perceived as 
morally reprehensible, it comes to be expected that the recipient of a favour will 
reciprocate by himself being willing to do something illegal when asked; that recipients 
of bribes will ‘honestly’ fulfil their side of bargains without cheating, and so forth. Under 
such circumstances, the intervention, in a given instance, by agents of law enforcement 
breaks norms of reciprocity prompting the question on the part of those targeted: since 
everyone engages in illegal activities or is prepared to do so if necessary, why target me 
rather than someone else? (Varese, 2000: 12) 
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What to do about it 
 
None of this is to suggest that in the globalised world of 2010, what is commonly referred 
to as organised crime is of little account. To make such a suggestion would be an affront 
to those who regularly die or are injured as the result of criminal activity – whether 
through the elimination of law enforcers and witnesses or when, for example, bribery and 
fraud lead to the adultery of food, the diversion of funds away from much-needed 
infrastructural projects, or the collapse of buildings erected without regard to safety 
standards. If these pathologies are to be eliminated, then it is essential that citizens 
perceive those in public life as behaving in accordance with norms of integrity and 
accountability. Otherwise, the state’s capacity to demand the loyalty of its citizens is 
undermined, thereby diminishing its capacity in fact to provide the protection citizens 
demand, and legitimising the search for alternative, illegal, means of obtaining security in 
a vicious circle. The Sicilian Mafia is merely one of the more extreme examples of this 
phenomenon – while some empirical evidence of the effects of citizens’ perceptions on 
their allegiance is provided by Figure 4 showing the inverse correlation between 
perceptions of corruption, and willingness to participate in elections. The final thing the 
expenses scandal has to say to worries about organised crime, therefore, is something that 
concerns the measures that might serve to increase the degree of citizens’ confidence in 
the probity of those in public life. 
 
 From this perspective, it is significant, in my view, that the scandal broke at the 
end of a long period, beginning in the early 1990s, that had seen an unprecedented 
volume of legislative activity ostensibly designed to improve the standards of those 
holding public office (for details of the legislation see Newell, 2008). Much, if not most 
of this activity, has stemmed from the annual reports of the Standards Committee, set up 
in 1994, by the then PM, John Major, as a standing body to provide advice to the 
government of the day on a continuous basis. Also significant, then, is the fact that this 
activity appears to have had very little impact on perceptions as far as one can tell. It 
coincides with a decline in the UK’s Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index score from 8.6 in 1995 to 7.7 in 2008. Table 1, based on data drawn from surveys 
carried out in 1983, 1993 and 2003, shows a small improvement in the trust placed in 
politicians and civil servants, but little or no change in the placement of these groups 
relative to others asked about.        
 
 If we ask about the reasons for this apparent oddity, we are prompted to suggest 
that, paradoxically, the attempts to assuage public anxieties may have helped to increase 
them by raising and keeping high the general salience of public probity as a political 
issue. First, the result of the activity has been to create an ‘institutional ethics framework’ 
all of whose bodies now publish annual reports ‘which ultimately inform the public on 
the ethical state of the country’ (Doig, 2004: 446). Second, the growing volume of 
legislation may have increased the likelihood of misconduct through a multiplication of 
the rules there to be broken – and thereby the likelihood of public outcry given the 
‘increasing disengagement of the media in reporting on politics as an activity rather than 
focusing on scandals and personalities’ (Doig, 2004: 448). This, as the recent activities 
and reports of the Standards Committee suggest, then gives rise to demands that 
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perceived gaps in the integrity system be plugged – resulting in further reform, and a 
further twist to the circle.3 Third, the growing profile and complexity of the ethical 
framework increases the opportunities for the launching of vexatious complaints and a 
‘heightened political tit-for-tat antagonism’ (Doig, 2004: 444) in conduct cases – which 
must necessarily contribute further to keeping the profile of the issue high.4 We may thus 
– assuming the legislation has in fact improved standards of integrity – be in the presence 
of an example of Tocqueville’s paradox.5
 
 This draws attention to the way in which 
improvements in states of affairs can actually increase rather than decrease levels of 
discontent because of their impact on people’s expectations. If this suggestion is true, 
then matters will not have been helped by the tendency of the Standards Committee to 
cast its net very widely, its recommendations having touched on issues that border on 
questions of financial probity but actually spill over into other areas (for example, 
discrimination, favouritism and freedom of information). 
Conclusion 
 
I am therefore led to conclude as follows. Reflecting on the characteristics of the MPs’ 
expenses scandal suggests first, that corruption, terrorism and the specific concern of this 
conference – organised crime – are socially constructed so that – second – understanding 
them requires us less to search for their causes than to understand how the concepts are 
deployed by different categories of political and social actor and for what purposes. 
Doing this – third – enjoins us to be appropriately sceptical when assessing the claims 
about these matters of those with an obvious interest in ensuring that some 
understandings of them prevail over others. Scepticism places us in a better position to 
meet our obligations as citizens and as academics to speak truth to power. Combating 
illegality and the harm that it does requires citizens who are trustful of their 
representatives (and by extension, trustful of each other). It requires, in short, good stocks 
of what people like Robert Putnam (1993) would call ‘social capital’. It seems unlikely 
that this social capital can be accumulated through legislative activity alone – suggesting 
the rather pessimistic conclusion that problems of bribery and other types of crime – the 
                                                 
3 For example, having persuaded Parliament, in the 1990s, to reform itself through acceptance of its 
recommendations for a code of conduct, a Commissioner and more detailed rules on the declaration of 
interests, the Committee on Standards has, on more than one occasion since, reviewed the reforms, each 
time proposing amendment. See, for example, its sixth report and its eighth report available through its web 
site, http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/ 
  
4 It was said, for example, that because of her zealousness, and the way she handled investigations, the 
second Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Mrs Elizabeth Filkin, created a climate in which there 
was an increase in cases driven by ulterior, political, motives (Doig, 2004: 444).  
 
5 ‘Tocqueville’s paradox was based on his studies of the French Revolution which led him to observe 
 
that in none of the decades immediately following the Revolution did our national prosperity make 
such rapid forward strides as in the two preceding it…. It is a singular fact that the steadily 
increasing prosperity, far from tranquilizing the population, everywhere promoted a spirit of 
unrest. Moreover, those parts of France in which the improvement in the standard of living was 
most pronounced were the chief centers of the Revolutionary movement….. It was precisely in 
those parts of France where there had been most improvement that popular discontent ran highest. 
[Pp. 174-76]’ (Wolf Jnr., 1970: 790)   
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two being empirically linked, the one being a condition for the other – are likely to be 
with us for some time to come.  
 
   
References 
 
Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckman (1966), The Social Construction of Reality, 
Harmondswoth: Penguin. 
 
Cressey, Donald R. (1972) Criminal Organization, London: Heinemann 
 
Cronin, Audrey (2003) ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, 
International Security 27(3): 30-58. 
 
Doig, Alan (2004), ‘Ethics, Sleaze and Codes: the Politics of Trust’, Parliamentary 
Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2, pp.435-452. 
 
Garrard, John A. (2005), ‘Scandals: An overview’, pp.13-29 in John A. Garrard and 
James L. Newell (eds), Scandals in Past and Contemporary Politics, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
Ginsberg, B. and M. Shefter (2002), Politcs by Other Means: Politicians, Presecutors, 
and the Press from Watergate to Whitewater, 3rd edition, New York and London: W. W. 
Norton. 
 
Johnston, Michael (2005) Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Moncrieff, Chris (2005), ‘A journalist looks at political scandal’, in John A. Garrard and 
James L. Newell (eds), Scandal in Past and Contemporary Politics, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
Mortimore, Roger (1995), ‘Politics and Public Perceptions’, pp.31-41 in F. F. Ridley and 
Alan Doig (eds), Sleaze: Politicians, Private Interests and Public Reaction, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Nelken, David (2003), ‘Political corruption in the European Union’, pp.220-33 in Martin 
J. Bull and James L. Newell (eds), Corruption in Contemporary Politics, London: 
Palgrave. 
 
Newell, James L. (2008), ‘Ethical conduct and perceptions of public probity in Britain: 
The story so far’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 9, no. 1, April 
2008, pp.39-52. 
 
Newell, James L. (2009), ‘Nice ‘n’ sleazy does it’, E-Pol, vol. 2, no. 3, October, pp.30-4, 
http://www.political educationforum.com/site/content_home.php. 
 13 
 
Paoli, Letizia (2003) ‘The invisible hand of the market: the illegal drugs trade in 
Germany, Italy and Russia’, pp.19-40 in Petrus van Duyne, Klaus von Lampe and James 
L. Newell (eds),  Criminal Finances and Organising Crime in Europe, Nijmegen: Wolf 
Legal Publishers. 
 
Putnam, Robert (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
  
Thompson, John B. (2000), Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Varese, Federico (2000), ‘Pervasive Corruption’, http://www.colbud.hu/honestytrust 
/varese/pub01 .PDF 
 
Wolf Jnr, C. (1970), ‘The Present Value of the Past’, The Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 783-792. 
 
 
      
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Guardian headlines containing the words 'terrorism', 'terrorist' or 'terror'
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Figure 1 Guardian headlines containing the roots 'corrupt' or 'bribe' or 'embezzle' or 'fraud' or  
'sleaze' 
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Figure 3 Guardian headlines containing the phrase organised crime
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1988 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
N
um
be
r
 
 
Figure 4 Scatter plot of CPI scores and general 
election turnouts, EU-27, 1995-2008
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Note: each point represents the turnout at a general election in one of the EU-27 countries, and the 
corresponding CPI score for that country in the given year. The figure is based on all elections in all the 
countries between 1995 and 2008 for which the relevant data were available. Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient = 0.37 
 
Source: own elaboration based on election turnout data taken from the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance website (http://www.idea.int/) and on CPI scores taken from the 
Transparency International website (http://www. transparency.org/) 
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Table 1 Groups trusted or not trusted to tell the truth, 1983, 1993, 2003 
 
 
 Tell truth Not tell truth Net 
improvement 
1983 – 2003 
 1983 1993  2003 1983 1993 2003 1983 – 2003 
 % %  % % % % + % 
Doctors 82 84 Family 
doctors 
92 14 11 8 +16 
Teachers 79 84 Head teachers 
in schools 
83 14 9 13 +5 
Judges 77 68 Judges 79 18 21 16 +4 
The Police 61 63 Local police 
officers on the 
beat in your 
area 
77 32 26 17 +21* 
Senior police 
officers 
67   27  
Television 
news readers 
63 72 Television 
news 
journalists 
49 25 18 46 –35 
Civil 
servants 
25 37 Top civil 
servants 
37 63 50 54 +21 
Politicians 
generally 
18 14 MPs in 
general 
28 75 79 66  +19 
Government 
ministers 
16 11 Government 
ministers 
24 74 81 69 +13 
Business 
leaders 
25 32 People who 
run large 
companies 
23 65 57 68 – 5 
Journalists 19 10 Journalists on 
newspapers 
like the Sun 
the Mirror  or 
the Daily Star 
7 73 84 89 – 28  
 
Sources: Mortimore, 1995, table 2; Survey of public attitudes towards conduct in public life 2003-04, 
BMRB Research. 
 
Notes:  
In 1983 and 1993, the question was: ‘Now I will read out a list of different types of people. For each would 
you tell me whether you generally trust them to tell the truth or not?’ In 2003, the question was: ‘These 
cards show different types of people. Please put them on this board to show which you would generally 
trust to tell the truth and which you wouldn’t’ 
* Net improvement calculated by using, for 2003, the mean scores for ‘local police officers on the beat in 
your area’ and ‘senior police officers’. 
